Kansas City Plant/ Complex Transformation
Fact Sheet and Talking Points 12/07
Compiled by Patricia Nelson, PeaceWorks, KC
Despite its central role in nuclear weapons production, the Kansas City Plant (KCP) (which produces all of the non-nuclear components that go into a nuclear weapon) has been left out of the national “Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement” that includes all key nuclear weapons facilities. (PEIS analyzes the potential consequences to the environment if certain changes to the Nuclear Weapons complex are implemented to support the Department Of Energy’s (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program). Each of the eight bomb factory sites have the opportunity to analyze and comment on the environmental impact of what is called “Complex Transformation” (CT), (formerly Complex 2030) – a $150 billion plan to modernize and expand the nuclear weapons complex. The KCP, however, is subjected to a less rigorous “environmental assessment”(EA) which means far less citizen input. This defies logic given the centrality of a new proposed $500 million Kansas City Plant near the former Richards-Gebaur base that would be tied directly to the development of a new generation of new nuclear weapons called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), i.e., the creation of a new nuclear bomb complex by the year 2030. The people of Kansas City are being denied a basic legal right that DOE knows it has to observe at all of its other nuclear weapons sites. (The)“NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) believes that it is appropriate to separate the analysis of the transformation of non-nuclear production from the Supplemental PEIS because decisions regarding non-nuclear activities would neither significantly affect nor be affected by decisions regarding the transformation of nuclear production activities.” Carlos A Salazar , GSA ( Federal Register/ Vol. 72, No 83 May 1, 2007) The production of these new deadly nuclear warheads, the RRW’s, will most likely lead to resumed testing. (peace-action.org) While the Bush administration talks about a smaller arsenal, it specifically plans to increase nuclear weapons components production at KCP and woefully under fund environmental restoration at the old plant. (ANA)
The people are against Complex Transformation. In Nov. and Dec. 2006, public comment hearings on Complex 2030 were held at 12 locations around the country. Hundreds turned out to protest the new nuclear weapons complex plans. During the written comment period that followed, approximately 32,000 members of the public registered their opposition. This is the most comments ever received on a DOE proposal and represents a true national referendum against Complex Transformation. (ANA) In KC at the May 23rd 2007 scoping hearing, approximately 200 people turned out and of the 35 comments that were made, only one was for the new plant proposal. (He wanted safer working conditions)
The Complex Transformation plan is unnecessary. Nuclear weapons are a cold war relic, and are strategically useless. The existing U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is already reliable and verified in more than 1000 nuclear tests. Further, the Nuclear Weapons Lab Directors have certified to Congress the reliability of the current stockpile every year since the 1992 testing moratorium. The DOE promises Complex Transformation will reduce costs, (DOE/EIS-0236, www.eh.doe.gov/neopa/eis/eis0236) but after the maintenance and modernization of the eight facilities, the creation of the new Consolidated Plutonium Center, and the design, development, and production of 125 new nuclear warheads a year until the year 2030, (a level comparable to what we had during the cold war), they estimate costs for this initiative at an astonishing $150 billion. Taking into consideration the history of DOE (and the Department Of Defense) cost overruns and the price of decommissioning and cleanup of the older nuclear warheads, the actual cost will likely exceed the DOE’s estimate. (peace-action.org)
William D. Hartung in “To Build or Not to Build” describes the Department of Energy’s plans for new facilities and capabilities and highlights the central role of the KCP in Complex Transformation. “It’s time that the KCP is recognized by the public and the nuclear policy community for what it truly is: the lynchpin of the weapons complex.”
The KCP produces non- nuclear mechanical, electronic and engineered material components for
U.S. National defense systems such as high-energy laser ignition systems, microwave hybrid microcircuit production and miniature electromechanical devices. The plant also provides technical services such as metallurgical/mechanical analysis, analytical chemistry,
environmental testing, nondestructive testing, computer-based training, simulations and
analysis and technical certification. (Wikipedia, Oct. 13, 2007)
In its own words, the Kansas City Plant “is an engineering and manufacturing services provider supporting early stage product ability programs, independent product design & manufacturability analysis , prototyping, low-volume production runs, product miniaturization, and ruggedized packaging. The integrations of knowledge and skills within a single facility allow us to engineer functional products to meet stringent customer requirements and expectations typically unavailable within commercial industry. We team with organizations needing applied engineering and manufacturing expertise for defense and national security product and technology development, KCP is an integrated manufacturing facility made up of a combination of technical resources, and equipment capabilities, and a breadth of competencies.
Customers can easily find the right skills at one location.” (etc.) (kcp website)
In other words, the KCP can retool and convert for almost any application, so why not create positive products that help society like alternative energy sources instead of nuclear bombs?
We do not blame the workers at KCP for taking these jobs, but we think they would sleep better at night knowing that the money they receive is not from creating WMDs.
Instead of building new nuclear weapons, PeaceWorks supports a “curatorship” approach which could accomplish the major stated goals of Complex Transformation: ensured reliability of the
stockpile (consisting of previously tested designs), no return to testing, increased dismantlement,
removal of dangerous and vulnerable nuclear materials from many sites, and increased efficiency. By taking such a step towards diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. military doctrine and foreign policy, this country could take the lead in moving all nuclear nations toward the goals of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
The Kansas City Plant is currently located at 93rd and Troost in Kansas City Missouri. It is owned by the Department of Energy and run by Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and Technologies Corporation for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
In 2005, NNSA challenged Honeywell ‘to transform the Kansas City Plant into a more cost-effective operation in order to meet the increasing demand of the nation’s nuclear deterrence.’
In July, 2005 the president of the Honeywell Corporation subsidiary that operates the plant said it was experiencing its heaviest workload in 20 years and will maintain this level of production until 2015. (Note: Similar to the workload during the Cold War era and the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.) The Kansas City Plant is shipping an average of 5000 nuclear weapons components per month. They produce eighty five percent of the non-radioactive components that go into a nuclear weapon. The KCP provides weapons support from concept through production and on to retirement. More than 100,000 parts are created annually –ranging from nuts and bolts to complex radars equiptment. (www.honeywell.com/sites/kcp/mission_history.htm), (KC Star article Oct.25th 2007.)
Currently housed in a sprawling 3 million square foot complex, the KCP comprises the largest portion of the Bannister Federal Complex in south KCMO. The facility, originally built in 1943 by the Navy during WWII to assemble engines for Navy fighter planes, was operated by Pratt-Whitney from early 1943 until Sept. 2, 1945. In February of 1949 the Atomic Energy Commission asked the Bendix Corporation to manage the facility and build non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons.
At the height of the cold war in the 1980’s more than 8000 people worked there. In recent years, that workforce has dwindled to 2600 people. Only 2000 workers will be employed by the new plant . The bulk of the employees, about 1,792, live in Missouri. The plant’s payroll in 2006
was $193 million, and the plant operators purchased $41.9
million in goods from Missouri business and $15 million from Kansas merchants.
KC development officials have estimated the plant could generate about $7
million annually in property taxes when fully operational.
The Complex Transformation plan is to build a $500 million nuclear weapons parts plant in south KC. The new plant that will replace the old will be near the former Richards-Gebaur Memorial Airport northwest of Missouri Highway 150 at Botts Road in Kansas City, MO. Funding to build the new facility would come from the commercial development community. Private investors would build the new facility and lease it to the General Services Administration (GSA) who would essentially sublease it to the NNSA. Unlike the currently owned and operated building, the new facility would be owned by a commercial landlord and the government would lease (rent) the building for a period of at least 15-20 years. (NNSA, KCP Responsive Infrastructure Program) The plant will be operated by Honeywell Federal Manufacturing and Technologies, which has the contract to manufacture the weapons parts for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The new facility would occupy a 185-acre campus and include buildings totaling up to 1.5 million square feet, according to the General Services Administration. The proposed facilities would cover more than 1 million square feet and provide over 2,000 surface parking spaces. Honeywell has retained Burns and McDonnell to design the technical specifications for the facility and supervise the relocation of all equipment and material from the old Bannister Plant. (Federal Register Vol 72)
(per Jay Coghlan) : “ I would mention that the Environmental Assessment was released 11/29 or 11/30, apparently without any public notice. Comments are due January 14, 2007. Definitely no official governmental hearing is planned (the EA says so). As a matter of demonstrating strong public interest, the EA states that 97 people signed in at the May 23, 2007 scoping meeting and 24 provided oral comment. I was there, and attest that there were yet more people and speakers (however, some speakers spoke twice). The EA states that approximately 500 people submitted written scoping comment (includes oral comments transcribed at the scoping hearing).
The EA excludes cleanup of the old plant, which a reference doc say will cost $287 million through 2030 (and you know that will be low). Further, that doc indicates cleanup would not even begin until FY15 at best. In context, that is because we wouldn’t want cleanup to get in the budget way of nuclear weapons refurbishments and RRW. (“Clean Up, Don’t Build Up!”) Superficially, this “business case” appears impressive and intimidating, but it my view the critical assumptions upon which its analyses are based render it ridiculous. Perhaps it greatest flaw is that the study assumes that since the old Kansas City Plant is owned by the GSA and leased to NNSA that an entirely new GSA-owned, 1 million+ square foot plant would have to be built “outside of the fence” from the Sandia Lab in Albuquerque. This inflates the costs of moving KCP functions to SNL/ABQ to begin with, which the study further exacerbates by including the cost of projected delays for a new GSA plant in Albuquerque, which the study estimates couldn’t be done for 8 years. In short, the study does not consider the consolidation of KCP functions within Sandia, but assumes a near autonomous plant bordering Sandia, driving up costs and blocking in advance potential cost savings such as single management, security, and infrastructure that are not even factored in. However, the alternative that will result in the most job loss is the preferred alternative of building an entirely new plant. The figure given is 900 jobs lost out of a current work plant force of 2,427 (figure from “KCP Fact Sheet” http://www.gsa.gov/kansascityplant), or a net job loss of 650.” “However, all six alternatives include the loss of 250 jobs, which the EA says has already been accomplished in FY07 through employee attrition (p. 8). So first, and to repeat, job loss is occurring under all alternatives. The alternative that has the smallest job loss is “No Action,” with 350 jobs lost, or 100 net. My ultimate point is that local politicians who support a new plant for the sake of jobs are supporting the alternative that results in the most job loss. “ (Jay Coghlan – ANA)
If Congress approves the plan, construction would begin in late 2008 or early 2009 with completion in fall 2010. The plant would not be fully occupied until 2012. No plans can be made for the current Bannister plant before 2015. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) by law must ensure the old plant site must be in satisfactory environmental condition before plans could be made for the land. Eventually the land will be sold to private developers. Various contingent plans for the facility are being explored through a GSA led Disposal Options Study. If cost effective, the building could be sold, used for other governmental entities, or used for commercial activities. The final disposal option will be subject to additional environmental analysis. (NNSA – KCP Responsive Infrastructure Program)
(Kansas City Star, Jan. 27th 2007) (KC Star Oct. 25th, 2007 – On October 24th )
KCP won a pivotal endorsement from the federal Office of Management and Budget. The weapons plant project has strong bipartisan support from the MO congressional delegation,
Congressional representatives issuing statements of support were Sen. Kit Bond, (R), MO,
Sen. Claire McCaskill (D) MO, and Reps. Emanuel Cleaver (D), MO, Sam Graves, and Ike Skelton. (KC Star)
According to their website the KCP is fully engaged in supporting NNSA’s nonproliferation mission. Their nonproliferation efforts are managed through NNSA’s office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) which is responsible for preventing the spread of materials, technology and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction. This mission is multifaceted and includes a variety of programs focused on detecting, preventing, and reversing the proliferation of WMD’s, while mitigating the risks from nuclear operations, The KCP participates in several of DNN's programs, most notably those designed to redirect the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons production complex toward commercial, non military applications,, reducing the infrastructure that could contribute to weapons production. In addition, they participate in a number of programs to analyze, identify and prevent the spread of technologies and materials essential for the production of WMD. (kcp website)
Nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of United States national security policy, and NNSA must continue to meet its responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. According to the DOE in the Notice Of Intent To Prepare A Supplement To The Stockpile Stewardship And Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement – or Complex 2030, “Stockpile Stewardship (Management Program) (SSM) includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of testing, and in the capability of the United States to resume nuclear testing if directed by the President. “ So the resumption of renewed testing is a possibility which would be against ComprehensiveTest BanTreaty signed by George H. W. Bush in 1996 but not ratified by Congress. (Federal Registry Vol. 71) Nuclear weapons are not the answer to the U.S. security problem because they are too blunt of an instrument to protect us from terrorists; dirty bombs in suitcases are more likely the weapon to fear from them. The act of building weapons harms our image and stimulates other countries to build weapons, creating worldwide instability. The U.S. is a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty of 1970. The U.S. is obligated to negotiate in good faith the elimination of its nuclear arsenal. Production and testing of a new generation of Nukes is against the treaty and against the law. (ANA)
The idea of deterrent works both ways. The other countries of the world with resources that the U.S. wants to control, like oil, have good reason to fear the U.S. military strength and nuclear weapons capability. Fear is what motivates the need to create a deterrent. Instead of emphasizing nuclear deterrence, we must work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies. We need to build strong export controls, better inspections and safeguards, tougher sanctions against violators and more targeted interdiction efforts. We must also reduce the potential availability of these weapons and technologies. To that end, the U.S. and the other nuclear powers should reduce their reliance on nuclear forces, decrease the size of their arsenals,
remove weapons from “dangerous alert” status and strengthen physical security so that nuclear weapons are not stolen or transferred. The nuclear weapons we do keep should be the minimum necessary to prevent the use of any nuclear weapons by others. (the Brookings Institute)
The current policy is contained in the Nuclear Posture Review, submitted to Congress in early 2002, which states that the United States will:
Change the size, composition and character of the nuclear weapons stockpile in a way that reflects that the Cold War is over; achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear warheads consistent with national security needs, including obligations to allies;
and transform the NNSA nuclear weapons complex into a responsive infrastructure that supports the specific stockpile requirements established by the President and maintains the essential United States nuclear capabilities needed for an uncertain global future. (Federal Registry/ vol.71
Oct. 19, 2006)
The Bush administration laid our a clear plan to expand the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal with new, so-called “useable” nuclear weapons, and outlined the possibility of using these weapons in a nuclear preemptive strike. However, Congress defeated the administration’s initial attempts to fund new weapons such as the nuclear “Bunker Buster” and Advanced Concepts program. Having learned from their defeat, the administration came back with a revised strategy, arguing that our current stockpile of nuclear weapons is “unreliable” and needs to be updated. Complex 2030 is at the heart of the Bush administration’s new proposal – a huge state-of-the-art nuclear weapons bomb factory that could crank out hundreds of new warheads a year. It is a complete overhaul of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex in the wrong direction. The NNSA claims that Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) is the “enabler” for transformation of the present nuclear weapons complex into a future “responsive infrastructure” capable of producing new-design nuclear weapons for unspecified future “changing military requirements.” The ex-head of the NNSA testified to Congress that he no longer viewed the existing stockpile as militarily appropriate. RRW gives NNSA the opportunity to design and produce new nuclear weapons for new military purposes, contrary to the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty’s mandate for nuclear disarmament. NNSA officials have floated the idea of lowering funding for “guards, guns and gates” if RRW is implemented, which could lessen security. NNSA should augment its existing nonproliferation expertise and provide the country with improved global monitoring, nuclear materials accounting and verification techniques, and not undermine the international nonproliferation regime by building new-design weapons. By pursuing the Complex Transformation the NNSA would be in violation of article VI of the U.S. Constitution that states, “all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.” It is the responsibility of the federal government to comply with the constitution that was written to insure the preservation of our union. Upholding its tenets, not by eroding them as is being done today, can only preserve our democracy and ultimately our security. (ANA)
According to the Department of Energy it is an integral part of the United States’ efforts to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation within DOE’s NNSA is responsible for the enhancement of United States national security through the following four-part strategy:
Ø Protecting or eliminating weapons and weapons-useable nuclear material or infrastructure, and redirecting excess foreign weapons expertise to civilian enterprises;
Ø Preventing and reversing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
Ø Reducing the risk of accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facilities worldwide
Ø And enhancing the capability to detect weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological systems. (www.energy.gov/national security/wind.htm)
In regards to the KCP under the auspices of NNSA’s mission “to protect the U.S. from the threat of an “adverse change in the global political climate”, consider this: an “adverse change” has happened in the American political climate. We currently have a president who has led us into an illegal and immoral war, and has done so in the face of unprecedented opposition from U.S. and citizens and the world. We witnessed his “shock and awe” display of military might over Baghdad, an act of state-sponsored terrorism against Iraqi noncombatant citizens with no means
to defend themselves. In the hands of a president who seems to be fraudulently in office, who erodes the checks and balances in the Constitution, (with the Patriot Acts 1 and 2), there is a frighteningly potential that the largest nuclear arsenal under the command of such a president could destabilized and cause an “adverse change” in the global political climate, posing a clear threat to its citizens.
According to the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) has lost track of at least 300 kilograms of plutonium 3/4 , enough to make 60 nuclear bombs. The entire nuclear weapons program has been run irresponsibly, is an environmental disaster, and is, in itself, a nuclear emergency. This raises serious security issues and also puts the integrity of Los Alamos National Laboratory’s entire plutonium waste and site remediation programs into question. (excerpt from Network of Spiritual Progressives – Northern New Mexico- editorials) The U.S. Department of Defense; Center for Defense Information ; reported that 11 nuclear bombs were actually lost in accidents and never recovered. (Greenpeace; “Lost Bombs” Atwood-Keeney Productions, inc. 1997)
In an article in the New York Times, interviews with Georgian and American officials, along with a review of confidential government documents, provide a glimpse into a world of smugglers who slip across poorly policed borders and the agents who try to stop them. The essential ingredients of nuclear weapons are vulnerable to theft and misuse due to the poor security around Russian facilities and financially unstable workers that run these nuclear structures. The threat is not, however, confined to the former Soviet Union. In August, the Washington Post reported Congressional investigators were able to obtain nuclear materials needed for a “dirty bomb” by setting up a fake company and a few months later, a U.S. nuclear-armed bomber flew over U.S. air space without special high-level authorization or safeguards. (peace-action.org)
Let’s not forget what nuclear weapons production has done to the environment in the past. In addition to nuclear weapons proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism, operations related to the production of nuclear weapons materials have led to massive radioactive contamination of the
environment. Thousands of square miles of land will be uninhabitable for thousands of years.
There is still no uniform, environmentally safe and secure means for disposing of the wastes generated today, but the Bush plan remains to ‘move ahead and produce more.’ (peace-action.org) Under Complex Transformation, DOE proposes a Consolidated Plutonium Production Center which would include an entirely new bomb plant capable of producing up to
125 plutonium pits (bomb cores) per year. Plutonium pit production creates a threat to public health and the environment. There are no plans in place for the dangerous waste stream from the 34 TONS of weapons-grade plutonium called MOX (mixed-oxide).
The U.S. Department of Energy/NNSA Kansas City Plant manufacturers a wide array of mechanical, electrical and engineered material components for our nation’s defense program. In support of this mission, beryllium alloys such as beryllium-copper and compounds such as beryllium oxide powder and ceramics have been used. Exposure to this metal dust has caused many health issues in workers. Beryllium is a known carcinogen. (Honeywell.com)
NNSA’s non-nuclear operations include the procurement and manufacture of electrical, electronic electromechanical, plastic and mechanical components for the nuclear weapons program. Hazardous wastes are generated through general industrial processes and include acidic and alkaline liquids, solvents, oils, coolants. and low- level radioactive waste. (Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 83 Tues. May 1, 2007) The land where the current “old plant” is located will not be useful for some time but very little proposed money has been allocated for cleanup before the move.
The proposed new KCP near Richards-Gebaur is part of the larger complex and the DOE must be held accountable for the environmental hazard that the complex has created. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 “the NNSA is to provide the nation with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, components and capabilities, and to accomplish this in a way that protects the environment and the health and safety of the workers and the public.”(Federal Registry) This has never been the case because serious accidents, exposures, spills and leaks are common and have occurred at Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, Livermore in CA, Los Alamos National Lab in New Mexico and the Y12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge. Before the U.S. proceeds with a major overhaul of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, they should first clean up the mess from
past production of nuclear weapons. The $150 B proposed for the new complex does not take
clean up into consideration.
Wall Street Journal Op-Ed by George P. Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam
Nunn, Jan 4, 2007: “Apart from the terrorist threat, unless urgent new actions are taken, the U.S. soon will be compelled to enter a new nuclear era that will be more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-American “mutually assured destruction” with an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the risk that nuclear weapons will be used. New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?”
They argue that the world is entering a new nuclear era, more dangerous than before, with nuclear know-how proliferating and nonstate terrorist groups seeking to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. They said a bold new vision is needed to reverse this trend and cited two world leaders as inspiration for their declared goal of a “nuclear-free world” – Ronald Reagan and Rajiv Gandhi. Both leaders shared an abhorrence of nuclear weapons. Reagan called them “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing.” Both leaders proposed their total elimination – Reagan at his summit with Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik in 1986 and Gandhi in a dramatic address to the United Nations in 1988 in which he proposed their elimination by 2010, adding the world must “put a stop to this madness.” Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, Nunn and others propose a number of urgent steps that would lay the groundwork for a world free of the nuclear threat, including:
Ø U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and efforts to secure ratification by other key states;
Ø providing the highest possible standards of security for all stocks of weapons and nuclear material everywhere in the world;
Ø and halting the production of fissile material for weapons globally.
Ø But, first and foremost, they say, “is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a
joint enterprise. (The Brookings Institute.edu.opinions/2007/1124_nuclear_weapons)
NNSA is requesting $281 million for “pit manufacturing and certification” for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, a 16% increase over FY 2007 funding. The agency plans to spend $1.34 billion on new plutonium pits between 2009 and 2012. NNSA is currently asking for $25 million to begin design work for a “Consolidated Plutonium Center” (CPC) capable of producing at least 125 pits per year. The U.S. presently has about 25,000 plutonium pits. Nearly 10,000 are in existing nuclear warheads. Five thousand are held in “strategic reserve.” More than 10,000 deemed “surplus” are stored at the Pantex Plant in Texas. (ANA)
Dr. Raymond Jeanioz, Chair, Nat’l Academy of Science’s Int’l Security and Arms Control Committee: “The remarkable finding is that the key materials making up the nuclear explosive package are far more stable and predictable than anyone would have anticipated. Recent developments reinforce the conclusion that plutonium pits and the U.S. Stockpile are stable over periods of at least 50 to 60 years and probably much longer.”
Senior scientists concur that the existing nuclear stockpile is not degrading. The nuclear pits will be reliable for another 80 to 100 years or more. There is no need to rebuild the stockpile by creating replacement warheads. The most appropriate stewardship activities would be to steward the stockpile out of existence, clean up contaminated areas, make reparations to those communities whose soil, air and water have been contaminated, and present a clear plan for consolidating and maintaining the security of the extremely toxic and dangerous nuclear weapons material. The JASON Defense Advisory group found that the plutonium pits in nuclear weapons have a lifetime of at least 100 years. A huge waste of taxpayer resources. The renovation of the nuclear weapons complex is expected to cost upward of $150 billion dollars. This is a major fraud stimulated by the National Nuclear Security Administration and weapons design labs to extract more money from taxpayers. According to a recent independent study “plutonium pits have reliable lifetimes of a century or more. (nukewatch.org) A report from 1993 from the Sandia National Laboratories concluded, “although nuclear weapons age, they do not wear out; they last as long as the nuclear weapons community (DOD and DOE) desires. In fact, we can find no example of a nuclear weapon retirement where age was ever a factor in the retirement decision” (nm)
Further production drains money away from needed social programs. The claim is to “consolidate” eight major sites into the same eight major sites – with billions of dollars worth of new bomb facilities added.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Legitimizes the nuclear arsenals of China, U.S., France, Britain and Russia, but establishes that they are not supposed to build and maintain such weapons in perpetuity. Article VI of the treaty holds that each state-party is to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” In 2000, the five NWS committed themselves to an “unequivocal undertaking… to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” (armscontrol.org)
It is believed by many that Syria and Iran are currently seeking nuclear weapons capabilities. START I limits the United States and Russia to 6,000 “accountable strategic warheads each. Figures are based on START counting rules, as negotiated between Washington and Moscow and specified in the treaty text. Thus, numbers do not necessarily reflect those weapons systems that are operationally deployed. (www.armscontrol.org)
A panel of scientists including three former directors of weapons laboratories, recently issued a scathing report on the RRW for the American Association for the Advancement of Science. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, the report concluded that the new warhead program may never achieve the cost savings claimed by the White House, the supposed safety and reliability improvements are unlikely to be realized until later generations of the weapons are developed, and that any U.S. effort to restart nuclear bomb production – which has halted after the Cold War – could provoke an international arms race. Robert Gallucci, former Assistant Secretary of State: “It’s passing strange…we would propose to improve confidence in the stockpile by replacing well-tested warheads with warheads that haven’t been tested. If the U.S. military later determines that testing is necessary, “you would have the worst of worlds” – uncertain warheads, abrogation of the test-ban treaty and serious damage to U.S. efforts to convince other nations that nuclear weapons aren’t necessary.”
A bad foreign policy move. Complex Transformation signals to the rest of the world that the U.S. is rebuilding a Cold War-size production capability. The U.S. cannot expect to convince nations such as North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear programs while it designs and plans for the production of a new generation of weapons. This provocative plan would increase the global nuclear danger, making our global community less safe.
“The weapons components currently coming to the KCP and the new generation of nukes that DOE wants so badly are undermining our security. We can’t dictate to other nations that they must not have these weapons when we are actively upgrading our own and planning on a new production complex for nukes.” (Marylia Kelly, Ex Dir Tri-Valley CAREs)
“On balance, I believe that we could defer action for many years on an RRW program, and I have no doubt that this would put us in a stronger position to lead the international community in the continuing battle against nuclear proliferation, which threatens us all.” (William Perry, former Secretary of Defense: Testimony before the House Energy And Water Appropriations Subcommittee, 3/28/07)
“On the RRW itself, if Congress gives a green light to this program in our current world environment, I believe that this will be : Misunderstood by our allies; exploited by our adversaries; complicate our work to prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons, including the essential steps I have outlined this morning; and make resolution of the Iran and North Korea challenges all the more difficult.” “I would not fund additional work on the RRW at this time.” (Senator Sam Nunn: Testimony before the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, 3/28/07)
FYI: According to BBC news and the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the countries that operate enrichment plants are: China, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Russia, Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, U.K., U.S. Pakistan, India, Argentina, Brazil, possibly Israel, Iran and North Korea. Other countries seeking to enrich uranium are Australia and South Africa. All, with the exception of North Korea and possibly Iran are doing so for energy purposes under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP). The nuclear weapons states are the United States, China, Russia, France, Britain, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Thirty-one countries are known to have fuel reactors according to the IAEA. For countries to be eligible for nuclear commerce, they must open up their facilities to safeguards, which are international mechanisms that are designed to detect and deter the misuse of civilian materials for weapons purposes. India
and Pakistan only partially comply and Israel will not let any one in. India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea have not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty. (pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/military, Kristina Nwazota)
Some interesting numbers:
According to the Brookings Institute U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Cost Study Project
from 1998 the estimated spending on all U.S. Nuclear weapons and weapons related programs was $35,100,000,000. The total number of nuclear missiles built between 1951 and 1998 was 67,500. The total known land area occupied by U.S. Nuclear weapons bases and facilities in 1998 was 15,654 square miles. The total land area of the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and New Jersey is 15,357 square miles. The projected operational U.S. strategic nuclear warheads and bombs after full enactment of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2012 is 1,700 – 2,200. From the U.S. Department of Defense, Natural Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook Project. From the U.S. Department of Energy, the fissile material produced as of 1998 was 104 metric tons of plutonium and 994 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium. Also, the total number of U.S. Nuclear weapons tests, 1945 to 1992 was 1,030. (1,125 nuclear devises detonated; 24 additional joint tests with Great Britain.) The number of high level radioactive waste tanks in Washington, Idaho and South Carolina was 239. The volume in cubic meters of radioactive waste resulting from weapons activities was 104,000.00. The U.S. currently has about 10,000 nuclear weapons. Since the Bush administration took office it has promulgated policies and pursued programs that continuously elevate the threat of nuclear proliferation and a possible nuclear war. (peace-action.org)
Recommendations from the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability:
Ø Congress should eliminate funding for further Complex Transformation planning.
Ø Congress should direct DOE to prioritize environmental cleanup instead of new weapons programs.
Ø Congress should increase DOE funding for dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
Ø Congress should mandate that DOE consolidate plutonium and highly enriched uranium at fewer, more secure sites, chosen to promote safety – not to serve weapons programs.
Ø Congress should eliminate funding for the RRW program.
Ø Congress should require further review of nuclear weapons reliability by independent technical experts. NNSA should proceed with accelerated dismantlement and verifiable, irreversible stockpile reductions without the RRW program.
Ø Congress should cut funding for expanded production of plutonium pits, including funding for the Consolidated Plutonium Center.
Ø Congress should bar any funding for the development or production of Reliable Replacement Warhead pits.
Ø Congress should cancel funding for the plutonium mixed oxide fuel program and approve funding for plutonian immobilization.
Ø Congress should order an investigation of missing plutonium at Los Alamos.
By using our available resources for humanitarian aid across the world, the U.S. would transform fear and the motives behind terrorism into mutual respect. By creating hope in the world the need for retaliation disappears. The American citizens who oppose Complex 2030 are striving to create a sustainable, socially responsible and compassionate global society.
By developing alternative energy sources and weaning ourselves from oil quickly, the security of the U.S. and the global community would be assured without the threat of nuclear weapons looming over us. Again, Complex Transformation should include the massive cleanup of the contaminated areas, support research in the remediation of radioactive wastes, find the means to make reparations to those communities whose soil, air and water have been contaminated and whose health has been effected and dismantle the weapons stockpile without replacing the warheads and present a clear plan for consolidating and maintaining the security of the extremely toxic and dangerous nuclear weapons materials in the inventory into perpetuity.
Complex Transformation is not needed to increase dismantlement; instead building RRWs could hinder dismantlement because the facilities that assemble bombs are the same facilities needed to take bombs apart.
ACTION – Call your senators and congresspersons TODAY and DEMAND that there be a formal public hearing after the Environmental Assessment is released by the General Services Administration with a 90 day period for public comment. Let each of us do our part and have the phones ring steadily at our Missouri and Kansas Congressional offices. We do need a new nuclear strategy – one of abolition – but we don’t need RRW. Luckily, Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Collins (R-ME) understand this. They have introduced S.1914, which prohibits funding for RRW through 2010 and calls for comprehensive nuclear policy and posture reviews before that. (9/24/07) CALL, WRITE AND EMAIL Congress and support this bill.
Thank you for your commitment – From the Peaceworks KC Board
Missouri
Senator Christopher Bond (816)471-7141
Senator Claire McCaskill (816)421-1639
Representative Emanuel Cleaver (816)842-4545
Representative Ike Skelton (816)228-4242h
Representative Sam Graves (816)792-3976
Kansas
Senator Sam Brownback (913)492-6378
Senator Pat Roberts (913)451-9343
Representative Dennis Moore (913)621-0832
Representative Nancy Boyda (785)234-8111
Capitol switchboard: (202) 224-3121
Additional Contacts:
At the Kansas City Plant: General Services Administration
Carlos A. Salazar
GSA Regional NEPA Coordinator
1500 East Bannister Rd, Rm. 2191 (6PTA)
Kansas City, MO 64131-3088
Phone (816)823-2305
Donna Constantineau, PeaceWorks, KC
KCMO (913)2815499
Jay Coghlan – Ex. Dir. Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Santa Fe, NM –(505)989-7342, cell (925)255-3589
William D. Hartung – Director, Arms and Security Initiative; New America Fdn.,
New York, NY – (212)431-5808ex201
Comments can be sent via email to Complex2030@nnsa.doe.gov. You can also mail your comments to: Theodore A. Wyka, complex 2030 SEIS Document Manager, Office of Transformation, U.S. Department of Energy, NA-1-.1, 1000 Independence Ave. S.W.,l Washington, DC 20585.
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